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ABSTRACT
Research Summary
This paper analyzes the impact of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office
Deferred Prosecution Program (DPP) on participation outcome patterns and compares
recidivism rates between a sample of DPP participants (695) and a comparison group
(991) of defendants found guilty through traditional adjudication from February 28,
2011 and December 5, 2012 with recidivism rates through June 6, 2014. Binary
logistic and cox proportional regressions were utilized to evaluate the program. No
statistically significant difference in re-arrest rates was found for a sample of DPP
participants and a comparison group of defendants found guilty through traditional
adjudication. However, DPP did have a statistically significant effect on re-arrest rates
for women charged with theft; in such cases, DPP reduced the likelihood of re-arrest
by roughly 76%.
Policy Implications
DPP has the potential to reduce the future collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction for individuals who complete the program. Although DPP seems to have
limited impact of re-arrest rates overall, the program may be revised to target certain
types of defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Costing local, state, and federal governments roughly $75 billion per year
(Schmidt, Warner, & Gupta, 2010), by 2013 just over two million people were housed
in jail or prison (Glaze & Kaeble, 2014). Notably, non-violent offenders who are
often deemed as less of an immediate threat to society, comprised an estimated sixty
percent of those incarcerated (Schmitt, Warner, & Gupta, 2010). Such incarceration
is not just expensive, but yields collateral damage to low-level non-violent offenders.
A felony conviction often limits social and economic participation in society, strains
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familial circumstances, and impacts entire communities (Travis, 2005; Travis &
Waul, 2004; Western, Braga, Davis, & Sirois, 2015). Indeed, scholars have discussed
the “invisible stripes” of former prisoners highlighting the stigmatizing impacts of a
conviction and subsequent incarceration that span beyond a prison term (LeBel,
2012).
Although in 2010 the prison population dropped by three percent for the first
time since 1972, the criminal justice system continued to encounter growing fiscal
constraints and social scrutiny that weakened the systematic use of incarceration as a
first response to low-level offenders (Travis, Western, & Redburn, 2014). At the state
level, policymakers responded by repealing mandatory prison sentences for low-level
offenses or by modifying sentencing guidelines to increase the use of nonincarcerative sentences for such offenses (Wool & Stemen, 2004). Many local
jurisdictions, however, reacted to these trends in a markedly different way, by
strengthening existing drug court and deferred prosecution programs that sought to
divert individuals out of the criminal justice system prior to a criminal conviction
(see, e.g., MacKenzie, 2006; Petersilia, 1998).
Deferred Prosecution Programs

Deferred prosecution programs are a type of diversion program that redirect
eligible persons charged with certain criminal offenses from traditional court
proceedings. Since the 1960’s, deferred prosecution programs have been a popular
alternative to rehabilitate drug offenders and have been used widely in juvenile cases
to avoid the stigma of a criminal prosecution and possible repercussions that
accompany a conviction (Senko, 2009). Deferred prosecution programs usually
monitor and track participants’ progress toward specific goals, often with the aim of
dismissing a pending charge upon successful completion (Burke, 2010).
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The guiding theory of DPP is therapeutic jurisprudence, which studies of the
extent to which legal rules, legal procedures, and the roles of lawyers and judges
produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for individuals involved in the
legal process (Wexler & Winick, 1991; Senjo & Leip, 2001). Over the past few
decades, this theory has evolved to “the use of social science to study the extent to
which a legal rule or practice promotes the psychological and physical well-being of
the people it affects” (Slobogin, 1995, p. 193). Therapeutic jurisprudence is applied
because DPP is meant to give first time offenders the opportunity to avoid traditional
criminal conviction and punishment and most DPPs often facilitate rehabilitative
treatment and social services. Given the stigma attached to a criminal conviction,
deferred prosecution programs provide eligible defendants with a “second chance” to
avoid the damaging effects of a criminal conviction (CCSAO, 2011).
Established and overseen by the chief prosecutor in a jurisdiction, deferred
prosecution occurs pre-adjudication allowing defendants to avoid prosecution for an
offense, pending their successful completion of program requirements. Such
programs are distinct from post-adjudication diversion programs, which require
defendants to plead guilty to a charge before they are offered services and monitored
in the community. As such, deferred prosecution programs have been shown to
reduce the volume and cost of cases handled by the court system, particularly when
only cases deemed urgent for public safety (those concerning violent crimes and
repeat offenders) are pursued through traditional adjudication (Senko, 2009;
Greenblum, 2005). Although few published studies have evaluated deferred
prosecution programs themselves, several studies have examined how successful
involvement in a deferred prosecution program influenced participants’ future
offending.

3

Recently, deferred prosecution and court diversion programs have increased in
popularity. These discretionary programs have largely been established to reduce the
likelihood of a defendant’s future involvement with the criminal justice system and to
offer defendants an alternative to traditional criminal conviction and punishment
(Salzberg, 1983). One study tracked the recidivism of former participants of a PostArrest Diversion Program (PAD) for first time non-violent misdemeanor juvenile
offenders in Miami-Dade County (Dembo et al., 2008). The study found that
successful completion of PAD significantly reduced graduates’ likelihood of re-arrest
over 12 months, controlling for socio-demographic variables, the charge type at first
arrest, and assessed recidivism risk level (Dembo et al., 2008). Similarly, a study of
the Correct Course Diversion Program in the Wayne County Juvenile Justice system
of Michigan found similar results, with just 7.7 % of program participants adjudicated
for a new offense over a similar one-year follow-up period. The evaluation also found
the costs of the program averaged $1,500 per person, which was considerably lower
than the average costs of proceeding with prosecution, which also resulted in further
savings through lower recidivism rates (Hodges, Martin, Smith, & Cooper, 2011).
Other studies included the Vanderburgh County Indiana Pre-Trial Diversion
Program (PTD) and examined factors related to program completion to access how
program completion was associated with reduced recidivism (Kixmiller, 1998). It
found that 50% of offenders aged 18 to 20 failed to complete the program, compared
to 12.4% of offenders age 41 and older. Moreover, women were more likely to
complete the program (72%) compared to men (57.2%) (Kixmiller, 1998). Although a
small case study of a rural county, it demonstrated that age, income and marital status
are key indicators of recidivism. A more recent study evaluated the Phoenix
Prostitution Diversion Program (Roe-Sepowitz, Hickle, Loubert, & Egan, 2011). This
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program required participants to plead guilty to their charge with the opportunity to
have their charge later dismissed upon successful program completion. Although this
program is different than traditional deferred prosecution programs because those
who do not successfully complete the program are left with a conviction, it is included
in this review because successful completion does revoke a participant’s criminal
charge. There was a significant relationship between participants’ completion of all
program requirements and a reduction in recidivism rates. Although several variables
increased the risk of a participant’s re-arrest for prostitution including: prior arrest for
prostitution, addiction to drugs and/or alcohol, and childhood physical abuse (RoeSepowitz et. al, 2011), only 14.5% of program participants in the study were
rearrested for prostitution within the first 12 months. Although this program
specifically analyzed prostitution offenders, the social programming associated with
the offense could have broad implications to reduce recidivism.
The majority of the published literature on deferred prosecution supports the
notion that these programs reduce the rates of recidivism among non-violent offenders
and are cost effective. Little evidence has found that deferred prosecution programs
increase rates of recidivism, but some research shows that some programs show
mixed results. In a study of a deferred prosecution program for DWI offenders in
Washington, researchers compared the recidivism rates of individuals accepted in the
program to the recidivism rates of individuals not accepted in the program (Salzberg
& Klingberg, 1983). The study found that there was little to no reduction of postdeferral alcohol- related traffic violations for those who participated in the deferred
prosecution program. However, the types of drivers selected for the program were
more likely to be older, male, and had more serious alcohol related violation records
along with more non-alcohol related violation records than those who were not

5

selected for the program (Salzberg & Klingberg, 1983). Inconclusive literature as
well as the need to provide support to other jurisdictions developing deferred
prosecution programs, highlights the need for further research to evaluate deferred
prosecution programs.
Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office Deferred Prosecution Program

In 2011, the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office (SAO) developed a
Deferred Prosecution Program (DPP), creating a mechanism by which defendants
could complete a program in exchange for an agreement by the prosecutor to not
prosecute the case. The main goals of DPP are stated: 1) to minimize the level of
resources allocated for non-violent offenders in the criminal justice system by
diverting such defendants out of the criminal justice system early in the process, 2) to
reduce the recidivism rates of program participants and 3) to provide an option for
eligible defendants to avoid a felony conviction, thereby preventing the collateral
consequences associating with a felony conviction.
DPP is a 12-month pre-trial diversionary program that is intended for firsttime, non-violent offenders charged with a felony crime. DPP is predicated on an
ongoing operational collaboration of the State’s Attorney’s Office with the Cook
County First Municipal District Judicial Circuit Court, the Department of Probation
Pre-Trial Services Division, and the social service organization, Treatment
Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC), all of which have key operational roles in
the DPP. The Assistant State’s Attorneys (ASA) at various Cook County Branch
Courts identify potential candidates, first time non-violent felony offenders, before
preliminary hearings are conducted. If victims agree and DPP candidates accept the
12-month program offer, the preliminary hearing is waived and the case is transferred
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to the DPP program, housed within a centralized branch located in the City of
Chicago.
Based on a prosecutor’s recommendation for entry into DPP and the
defendant’s acceptance of the program, Pre-Trial Services developed an
individualized program plan for each participant. Coined as a low demand program1,
DPP requirements included: the promise to not reoffend; the initial assessment plan;
regular court appearances in the centralized DPP branch court; monthly meetings with
a Pre-trial Services officer; and meeting of certain conditions depending on particular
offenses and participants’ educational and employment status. In order to
successfully complete the program, defendants in DPP needed to meet restitution;
employment, education, and minimal substance use treatment requirements when
applicable, and attend all court dates. Upon successful completion of the program, the
felony charge was dismissed by the SAO, exercising its prosecutorial discretion and
the participant can then have his or her criminal arrest expunged.
Part of the Evaluation of the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office Deferred
Prosecution Program examines the program outcomes. This paper will analyze the
impact of the DPP program on participation outcomes patterns and compare
recidivism rates between a sample of DPP participants and a comparison group of
defendants found guilty through traditional adjudication. A major strength of our
study design is that we utilized multiple data sources, which allowed us to examine
the impact of DPP on both the criminal justice system and individual level. It is
hypothesized that individuals who utilize the DPP will have lower recidivism rates
than those in the comparison group.

1

By low demand program we mean no mandatory services such as therapy, drug testing unless special
circumstances and house visits. Although there are program requirements, see summary above.
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METHODS
Data

This study relies on administrative data maintained by DPP, case management
data maintained by Pre-trial Services, case management data maintained by the
Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC), case management data
maintained by the Cook County Circuit Court Clerk, and criminal history data from
the Illinois State Police database, accessed through the Illinois Criminal Justice
Information Authority (ICJIA). Data obtained from the State’s Attorney’s Office
(SAO) on DPP clients were in an identifiable format, containing individuals’ names
and dates of birth. This study was approved by the IRB at Loyola University Chicago.
A comparison group was constructed by ICJIA research staff from Cook
County Circuit Court Clerk data, using the eligibility requirements for DPP
participation and other salient characteristics of the DPP sample. Researchers
provided ICJIA with the names and birth dates of all individuals in the Treatment
Group and Comparison Group; ICJIA then conducted a criminal history search and
returned recidivism data for all individuals. Once we merged criminal history data
with the original data obtained from the SAO, all identifiers were deleted from the
original dataset and from the requests made to ICJIA. Combined, these sources
enabled the tracking of recidivism outcomes for individuals in both Treatment and
Control Groups of this study and provided all individual-level covariates noted below.
Sample

We compared all individuals who participated in DPP between February 28,
2011 and December 5, 2012 to a comparison group consisting of a sample of “DPP
eligible” individuals not referred to DPP but adjudicated in Cook County during the
same time. Individuals who were not enrolled in DPP was because of several factors
including the public defender not knowing about DPP, the judge’s buy-in for DPP,
8

and the geographic locations of courts that would consider DPP. Construction of the
comparison group by ICJIA followed these criteria: 1) arrest charge comparability to
the DPP sample, so that the most serious arrest charges corresponded to the
distribution of eligible charges in the DPP participant sample; 2) prior criminal
history, which were selected to be no prior felony convictions and no prior arrests for
a violent offense; and 3) case disposition, which were selected to be guilty verdict
with a non-incarcerative sentence. Defendants in the treatment and comparison
groups were also coordinated on a limited set of demographic and case characteristics,
including age, sex, and date of case filing.
Recidivism outcomes for both treatment and comparison groups were tracked
through June 6, 2014 (see Measures below). The sample was limited to include only
those individuals in each group with at least 18 months’ time in the community after
either admission to DPP or final case disposition; this procedure allowed recidivism
rates to be computed across subgroups accounting for differences in time-at-risk.
Individuals in the study samples experienced different lengths of exposure to failure
(measured by arrest). Success and failure rates for individuals exposed to risk
according to an 18-months threshold was computed. This procedure further decreased
the size of study samples because only individuals at risk for at least 18 months were
included. Finally, the sample was restricted to include only individuals 18 years of
age or older. The final dataset includes 695 individuals admitted to DPP and 991
“DPP eligible” individuals not admitted to DPP but adjudicated guilty through the
traditional adjudication process creating the comparison group.
Measures

The main outcome measure is a categorical binary variable capturing whether
an individual was re-arrested or was not re-arrested during the 18 months of follow-up
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after admission to DPP (treatment group) or final disposition date (comparison
group). Individuals were counted as re-arrested if an arrest occurred or a warrant was
issued within 18 months after admission to DPP or final disposition date. Time to
failure was measured by days, until an individual was re-arrested or completed 18
months of time-at-risk without a re-arrest.
Several individual-level demographics were included in the analyses. Two
indicators of criminal history were employed, tracking the number of misdemeanor
arrests (continuous) and the number of felony arrests (continuous) occurring prior to
an individual’s admission to DPP or judgment date (not counting the arrest triggering
DPP admission or judgment). Current offense information was included as a
categorical variable (1= retail theft, 2=burglary, 3=PCS/cannabis, 4=possession of a
stolen vehicle, 5=forgery, 6=ID theft/unlawful use of a credit card/fictitious ID,
7=criminal damage to government property, 8=counterfeit trademarks/deceptive
practices, 9=unlawful use of a recording device, 10=disorderly conduct, and 11=false
report to the police), using retail theft as the reference category for analyses.
Demographics were defendant’s race, (0=White, 1=Black, 2= other), defendant’s sex,
(0=Female, 1=Male), and defendant’s age in years at the time of admission to DPP
(treatment group) or judgment date (comparison group).
Analyses

The impact of DPP on defendant outcomes was analyzed using two sets of
analyses. First, a binary logistic regression was used to estimate the effect of DPP
relative to standard adjudication on re-arrest at 18-month follow-up. These models
predict the likelihood of re-arrest controlling for defendant-level predictors such as
demographic characteristics and criminal history. Second, Cox proportional
regression models were used to estimate the effect of DPP relative to standard
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adjudication on time to re-arrest within 18 months follow-up. These models predict
the time to re-arrest controlling for defendant-level predictors such as demographic
characteristics and criminal history.
RESULTS
Difference in Re-Arrest Rates

The impact evaluation examines outcomes for 695 DPP participants and 991
defendants in a comparison group of comparable defendants found guilty through
traditional adjudication. The association between DPP participation and re-arrest was
analyzed by frequencies, controlling for other defendant-level and case-level
attributes (Table 1). The main outcome variable – re-arrest within 18 months – shows
little variation across the treatment and comparison groups. 31.4% of DPP
participants were re-arrested within 18 months of admission to DPP compared to
33.5% of defendants in the comparison group. DPP participants were more likely to
be female (38.9% vs. 32.5%), white (46.9% vs. 41.1%), and younger (26.3 years old
vs. 27.5 years old) than individuals in the comparison group. Defendants in the
treatment and comparison groups were fairly similar in terms of prior criminal history
and charges, with two notable exceptions – DPP participants were more likely to be
charged with retail theft and less likely to be charged with theft than individuals in the
comparison group. Despite these differences, the treatment and comparison groups
generally were similar.

Differences between men and women

Initial frequency analyses showed significant differences between women and
men in terms of recidivism rates, age, and offense. Thus, the treatment and
comparison groups were split into separate groups by sex. As Table 1 shows, the main
outcome variable – re-arrest within 18 months – shows significant variation between
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women and men, yet little variation across the treatment and comparison groups for
men. 22% of female DPP participants were re-arrested within 18 months of admission
to DPP compared to 28% of female defendants in the comparison group; in contrast,
38% of male DPP participants and 38% of male defendants in the comparison group
were re-arrested within 18 months. Table 1 also showed slight demographic
differences between women and men and between the treatment and comparison
groups. Women in both DPP and comparison groups were slightly more likely than
men to be non-white, older, and charged with retail theft, theft, or forgery. In addition,
both male and female individuals in the comparison group tended to have more
serious criminal histories than DPP participants. Despite these differences, the
treatment and comparison groups generally were very similar across these limited
covariates.
INSERT TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics: Sample of DPP Participants and
Comparison Group, by Sex
Because of the high rate of missing values for defendant race, race is not included in
the analyses below. Similarly, because of the low number of individuals charged with
possession of a stolen vehicle, criminal damage to government property, counterfeit
trademarks/deceptive practices, unlawful use of a recording device, disorderly
conduct, or false reports to police, individuals charged with these offenses were
excluded from the final analyses.
Binary Logistic Regression Models Outcomes

A series of binary logistic regression models were administered to examine the
association between DPP admission and re-arrest net of other defendant-level
attributes (Table 2). Model 1 assessed the influence of DPP on re-arrest rates relative
to all individuals in the comparison group. Odds ratios for DPP variable represented
the independent influence of DPP on re-arrest relative to traditional adjudication,
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controlling for other defendant and case factors. Estimates in Model 1 demonstrated
that controlling for a number of defendant-level covariates, DPP had no statistically
significant effect on re-arrest relative to traditional adjudication. Thus, after
controlling for other demographic and legal variables, DPP participants were found to
be no more or less likely to be re-arrested than defendants handled through traditional
adjudication. As Model 1 indicates, several factors traditionally found to be associated
with recidivism were associated with re-arrest among the study sample – defendants
who were male, younger, and had more prior misdemeanor and felony arrests were
more likely to be re-arrested within 18 months. Specifically, being male increased the
likelihood of re-arrest by 47%. Each additional year of age decreased the likelihood of
re-arrest by 3%. Finally, each additional prior misdemeanor arrest and each additional
prior felony arrest increased the likelihood of re-arrest by 13% and 18% respectively.
Finally, defendants charged with theft and forgery were less likely to be re-arrested,
relative to defendants charged with retail theft. Yet, the model is relatively weak in
explaining re-arrest – these factors explain just 12% of variance in outcomes; thus,
86% of the variance is explained by other factors not included in the model.
Significant differences in outcomes based on the sex of the defendant were
found, thus the models were re-analyzed separately for women and men. Model 2
assesses the influence of DPP on re-arrest rates only for women; Model 3 assesses the
influence of DPP on re-arrest rates only for men. Again, odds ratios for DPP variable
represented the independent influence of DPP on recidivism relative to traditional
adjudication, controlling for other defendant and case factors. Estimates in Models 2
and 3 demonstrate, controlling for a number of defendant-level covariates, DPP had
no effect on re-arrest for women or men relative to traditional adjudication. Thus,
after controlling for other demographic and legal variables, female and male DPP
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participants were no more or less likely to be re-arrested than defendants handled
through traditional adjudication. As Model 2 indicates, female defendants who had
more prior misdemeanor and felony arrests were more likely to be re-arrested within
18 months; in turn, female defendants charged with forgery were less likely to be rearrested within 18 months, relative to female defendants charged with retail theft.
Consistent with Model 1, Model 3 indicates that male defendants who were younger
and had more prior misdemeanor and felony arrests were more likely to be re-arrested
within 18 months.
INSERT TABLE 2 Binary Logistic Regression Models of the Effect of DPP on ReArrest in 18 Months
Initial analyses revealed differences in re-arrest rates across offense
categories. For example, as Table 3 indicates, re-arrest rates for theft and forgery
were much lower that re-arrest rates for other offenses, particularly for female
defendants. Thus, the data was further disaggregated by offense type and examined
the effect of DPP on re-arrest for each of the six specific offenses listed above (retail
theft, burglary, PSC/cannabis, theft, forgery, and ID theft/unlawful use of a credit
card/fictitious ID) (Table 3). As Table 3 indicates, DPP had a significant effect on rearrest rates for women charged with theft; in such cases, DPP reduced the likelihood
of re-arrest by 76%. For all other offenses, DPP had no significant effect on re-arrest.
Thus, after controlling for other demographic and legal variables, DPP
participants were no more or less likely to be re-arrested than defendants handled
through traditional adjudication. Although not reported here, the models also
indicated that several factors traditionally found to be associated with recidivism
continued to be associated with re-arrest – defendants who were younger and had
more prior misdemeanor and felony arrests were more likely to be re-arrested within
18 months.
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INSERT TABLE 3: Re-arrest Rates within 18 months by gender and Binary Logistic
Regression Models of the Effect of DPP on Re-Arrest, Disaggregated by Offense
(DPP Coefficients only)
Cox Regression Models Outcomes

Logistic regression analyses simply allow for an analysis of failure (in this
case, re-arrest); but they do not account for time to failure. Although there may be no
differences in re-arrest rates for individuals in the treatment and comparison groups,
there may be differences in time to failure. Cox regression analyses examined the
impact of independent variables on time to failure and produces a survival curve,
which allows a graphical analysis of failure times across groups. A series of Cox
regression models were implemented to examine the association between DPP
admission and time to re-arrest net of other defendant-level attributes (Table 4).
Model 4 assesses the influence of DPP on time to re-arrest relative to all individuals
in the comparison group. Odds ratios for DPP variable represent the independent
influence of DPP on time to re-arrest relative to traditional adjudication. Estimates in
Model 4 show that, controlling for a number of defendant-level covariates, DPP had
no effect on time to re-arrest relative to traditional adjudication. Several factors
traditionally found to be associated with recidivism were associated with time to rearrest among the study sample – defendants who were male, younger, and had more
prior misdemeanor and felony arrests were more likely to be re-arrested within 18
months. Again, being charged with theft and forgery increased the time to re-arrested,
relative to defendants charged with retail theft.
As in the logistic models above, the models were re-analyzed separately for
women and men. Model 5 assesses the influence of DPP on time to re-arrest only for
women; Model 6 assesses the influence of DPP on time to re-arrest only for men.
Again, odds ratios for DPP variable represent the independent influence of DPP on
time to re-arrest relative to traditional adjudication, controlling for other defendant
15

and case factors. Estimates in Models 5 and 6 show, controlling for a number of
defendant-level covariates, DPP has no effect on time to re-arrest for women or men
relative to traditional adjudication. As Model 5 indicates, female defendants who had
more prior misdemeanor and felony arrests were more likely to be re-arrested within
18 months; in turn, female defendants charged with forgery were less likely to be rearrested within 18 months, relative to female defendants charged with retail theft.
Model 6 indicates that male defendants who were younger and had more prior
misdemeanor and felony arrests were more likely to be re-arrested within 18 months.
INSERT TABLE 4: Cox Regression Models of the Effect of DPP on Re-Arrest

DISCUSSION
When assessing the impact of DPP using binary logistic regression and Cox
proportional regression models, it was found that 695 individuals exited the program,
68.6% (n=477) and had their cases dismissed (Nolle Pros), indicating a successful
completion of the program; and 31.4% (n=218) of individuals were terminated from
the program, indicating an unsuccessful completion of the program. There was little
difference in re-arrest rates for a sample of DPP participants and a comparison group
of defendants found guilty through traditional adjudication. Nevertheless, DPP had a
significant effect on re-arrest rates for women charged with theft; in such cases, DPP
significantly reduced the likelihood of re-arrest by 76%. Although DPP seems to have
limited impact of re-arrest rates overall, the program may be revised to target certain
types of defendants (e.g., older, women) or defendants charged with certain types of
offenses (e.g., theft). Moreover, DPP significantly reduces the future collateral
consequences of a criminal conviction for all individuals who complete the program.
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Impact of Program on Participants

As evidenced by this paper, the results indicate that DPP participants were no
more or less likely to recidivate than individuals adjudicated through traditional mean
of dismissal or a finding of guilty. Rather, re-arrest appears to be driven by many
factors traditionally associated with recidivism – sex, age, and prior criminal history.
If in fact the re-arrest rates are driven by the issues of sex, age and personal
history, the findings point to a re-consideration of the current low demand program
model and to augment the content of the program to include additional services for
participants; expanded services targeted at education, employment, and mental and
substance abuse needs, as demonstrated by the therapeutic jurisprudence theory
(Slogobin, 1995). These are factors known to affect risk of future criminal
involvement and as such could improve DPP’s impact of participant outcomes as
well. Thus, expansion in both the capacity and scope of the program could improve
the systemic and individual-level impact of the program for Cook County.
TASC, the social service program that assisted with DPP, had limitations. In
accordance to therapeutic jurisprudence theory, incarcerated individuals would have
the most success when they have more supportive services (Wexler & Winick, 1991).
Unfortunately, participants in both the comparison and DPP groups had limited
interaction with TASC. In cases in which DPP participants asked Pre-Trial Officers
for assistance in finding a GED program or support for a drug, alcohol or mental
health condition, Pre-Trial Services referred clients to TASC case managers for
further assistance. Although, Pre-Trial Services reported they were usually able to
direct DPP participants to a GED program themselves. It was found that most clients
received assistance from Pre-Trial Services and few (11%) were referred to TASC.
Notably, the DPP participants interviewed said they had never heard of TASC before
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and asserted they could have benefited from TASC’s services, particularly with job
leads. Barriers to TASC and additional social services stemmed from the lack of
coordination of care for the participants and communication within the system of
available services. Since the second largest offense by DPP participants was
possession of narcotics, a program like DPP might consider adding more resources of
participants. Seeing how the criminal justice system is the number one treatment
facility for mental health issues (s), options are needed to help any diversion program
participant to receive the help that they need in a non- forceful manner.
The current low demand program model has been demonstrated in literature to
be a cost-effective way of delivering one of the key outcomes to participants: a lack of
criminal conviction; and to the justice system, less individuals going through a costly
adjudication (Wool & Stemen, 2004; MacKenzie, 2006; Petersilia, 1998). An average
of 35 individuals per month are admitted to DPP since the inception of the program.
Examining a sample of those (695) in the impact evaluation, 68.6% (477) successfully
completed the program and, in turn, avoided a criminal conviction. Thus, although the
re-arrest rates for DPP participants and comparable defendants adjudicated through
traditional prosecution were the similar, these successful DPP participants avoided the
stigma of a felony conviction. Lastly, we want to highlight that individuals in the
comparison group as opposed to the treatment group (those in DPP) by definition had
non-incarcerative sentences, meaning that most were likely to be a involved in
probation programs that included more rigorous monitoring and services as compared
to DPP participants in the treatment sample. This reality may provide the comparison
group with more treatment options.
Nevertheless, the impact of avoiding a criminal conviction cannot be
overstated – a felony criminal conviction can significantly impact an individual’s
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ability to find employment, stable housing, and advanced education. Although DPP
may not significantly reduce the likelihood of re-arrest, DPP certainly minimizes the
future collateral consequences of a criminal conviction for all individuals who
complete the program.
Limitations of the Study

We encountered several research limitations limiting our ability to fully
examine the impact of the program. Although the data provided by the various
agencies were helpful in examining admissions and exits to the program, assessing
time in the program, and describing the types of offenses with which participants
were charged, they, nonetheless, provided little information about program content,
participation in services, or participant demographic characteristics (age, ethnicity,
race, employment status, educational achievement, income, substance use history,
etc.) generally necessary for conducting recidivism analyses. As such, our ability to
examine the effects of individual-level attributes such as substance abuse history,
employment status, supervision levels, etc. on case outcomes was limited by the data
available. Moreover, data limitations also prevented an examination of other
outcomes (e.g., substance use, pro-social activities, etc.) that may be affected by
participation in DPP. It would also be of notation to investigate the participants
reaction of the DPP process as individual experiences of the process could mitigate
the outcomes (Cossyleon, Orwat, George, Stemen, & Key, 2017).
In addition, evaluation studies of criminal justice programs generally use rearrest as the measure of program outcome because it is the benchmark used by most
policy makers to assess the long-term impact of interventions (Young, Fluellen &
Belenko, 2004). Although re-arrest is an imperfect measure – as it does not capture
all potential measures of deviance (e.g., substance abuse, un-reported criminal
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activity, technical violations of supervision, etc.) and, in turn, is highly dependent on
law enforcement discretion – we used this measure as it likely provides the best
measure by which to compare DPP participants to individuals prosecuted through
traditional adjudication processes.
Recommendations

To improve both the functioning and evaluation of deferred prosecution
programs, case management systems should be designed to identify several factors.
To fully understand demand/need for the program and trends in programs admissions,
program administrators should collect information that can determine: the number of
defendants eligible for deferred prosecution; the number of defendants offered
deferred prosecution; the reasons for why defendants were not offered the program;
the number of defendants refusing deferred prosecution; and the reasons for
defendants’ refusal of deferred prosecution.
This would require that data collection begins at the branch courts, capturing
information on all eligible defendants when the initial decision to offer or not offer
deferred prosecution occurs. Program administrators should also seek to collect more
detailed information that can assess the need/use of services for deferred prosecution
participants, including: defendants’ needs for employment, education, and treatment
programs; the number of referrals to TASC; the outcomes of TASC needs
assessments; the number and type of TASC referrals to services; and the number of
completions of programs following TASC referrals.
Finally, to gain a better understanding of the factors associated with program
outcomes and future re-offending, program administrators should seek to collect more
detailed information about defendants, particularly factors associated with
risks/needs: defendant marital, employment, and education status; defendant housing
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status; and defendant prior criminal history. These are general categories of
information that could assist in program design and evaluation.
Conclusions
This paper presented findings of the impact of the Evaluation of the Cook
County State’s Attorney’s Office Deferred Prosecution Program (DPP), a preindictment diversion program for first time felony offenders. Although the findings
were mixed, the implications for further research and practice allow for potential
interventions. This research is important in helping to guide Deferred Prosecution
program developers, policy makers, and treatment staff to best implement deferred
prosecution programs and to assist in identifying eligible participants most likely to
benefit from these programs. Creating and implementing a deferred prosecution
program may be a turn in the right direction towards lowering incarceration rates.
However, in order to improve the systems of tracking participants of deferred
prosecution programs, jurisdictions must invest time and resources towards better
understanding the candidates and participants of such programs. Doing so, will yield
answers to questions about the circumstances that lead people to abstain from reoffending along with more grounded evidence for tailoring programmatic contents of
such programs.
The expansion of DPP programs across the state and country are certainly a
viable option given their success in reducing both the cost and collateral
consequences for defendants in comparison to traditional adjudication. In Illinois,
DPP programs can be expanded to reside in other court branches in addition to the
centralized “26th and California Branch” and could be increased in size to include
additional participants. Moreover, given the lack of statistically significant impact of
DPP on re-arrest rates, there also exists an opportunity to improve the content of the
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program to include additional services for participants. Although deferred prosecution
programs that offer minimal rehabilitative services for participants may be a lower
cost alternative for counties, jurisdictions can potentially work in collaboration with
community organizations that are already doing this type of rehabilitative work in the
community as one option. Instead of having DPP participants as an extra caseload for
these community organizations, DPP participants can be part of their traditional
caseload as defined by Department of Corrections funding sources. Thus, increasing
both the capacity and scope of the program could improve the systemic and
individual-level impact of the program for Cook County. Further research should be
aimed at examining deferred prosecution programs themselves to fill a gap in research
on diversion programs and to provide an overview of program specifics for possible
replication.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics: Sample of DPP Participants and Comparison Group, by Sex
Women

Men

Combine
d

DP

Compariso

DP

P

n

P
426

Compariso DP
P
n
660 695

Compariso
n

Total cases

269

331

991

Re-arrest rate

21.9

27.8 37.6

38.1 31.4 34.6

White (%)

36.8

34.7 53.7

45.1 46.9 41.6

Black (%)

42.8

45.9 28.4

37.6 34.0 40.4

Other (%)

2.6

within 18 months
(%)

Race

Missing (%)

0.6

1.9

2.0 2.3

1.5

17.8

18.7 16.1

15.3 16.8 16.5

28.5

29.2 27.3

26.8 26.3 27.5

1.16

1.66 2.07

2.65 1.94 2.31

0.93

1.32 1.31

1.56 1.22 1.46

0.7

3.0 22.0

18.4 13.7 13.2

Retail theft (%)

48.3

33.5 12.3

12.7 26.3 19.7

PSC/Cannabis

10.4

11.5 27.4

21.5 20.7 18.3

16.7

26.0 13.2

24.4 14.7 24.9

Age (mean years)*

Criminal History
Prior
misdemeanor
arrests (mean)
Prior felony
arrests (mean)

Charges
Burglary (%)

(%)
Theft (%)
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Possession of a

1.1

0.3

3.3

4.9 2.4

3.3

11.9

12.4

5.7

3.9 8.1

6.8

5.6

7.3

4.5

5.6 5.0

6.2

1.5

3.3

4.7

5.0 3.5

4.4

0.7

--

1.4

-- 1.2

--

0.4

--

2.1

0.8 1.4

0.5

1.9

--

1.7

-- 1.7

--

--

2.7

--

0.7

--

1.7

stolen motor
vehicle (%)
Forgery (%)
ID theft/unlawful
use of a credit
card/Fictitious
ID (%)
Criminal damage
to government
property (%)
Counterfeit
trademarks/decepti
ve practices (%)
Unlawful use of a
recording device
(%)
Disorderly
conduct (%)
False report to

2.7 --

2.7

police (%)
Other (%)

-- 1.3

--

* Measured at date of admission to DPP or judgment date
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Table 2
Binary Logistic Regression Models of the Effect of DPP on Re-Arrest in 18 Months

Independent

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

All defendants

Women

Men

B (S.E.)

Odds

B (S.E.)

Odds

B

Odds

(S.E.)

Variables

Group
DPP

-0.030

0.971 -0.098

(120)

Sex (male)

0.387

.907

(.216)

0.035

1.035

(.148)

1.472 --

--

--

0.971 -0.012

0.988 -

--

(.137)**

Age (years)

-0.030
(.007)***

(.010)

0.960***

0.041
(.009)

Prior misdemeanor

0.122

arrests (number)

(.022)***

Prior felony arrests

0.167

(number)

(.053)**

1.130 0.195

1.216 0.103

(.050)***

1.182 0.365

1.109***

(.024)

1.441 0.143

(.143)**

1.154**

(.055)

Offense
Retail theft

--

--

--

-0.101

0.904 0.238

(.198)

(.643)

--

--

--

(reference)
Burglary

1.268 -

0.853

0.159
(.234)
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PSC Cannabis

-0.082

0.922 -0.246

(.177)

(.336)

0.782 -

0.946

0.056
(.227)

Theft

-0.412

0.662 -0.461

(.176)*

0.630 -

(.283)

0.698

0.359
(.236)

Forgery

-0.590

0.554 -0.896

(.253)*

0.408 -

(.378)*

0.750

0.288
(.361)

ID theft/unlawful use
of CC/Fictitious ID

-0.154

0.857 0.180

(.258)

(.386)

1.197 -

0.708

0.346
(.352)

-2 log likelihood
Negerlkereke pseudo r
Chi-square

1756.585

582.613

1159.108

.129

.127

.114

145.889***

50.548***

81.430***

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
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Table 4
Cox Regression Models of the Effect of DPP on Re-Arrest
Model 4
Model 5
All defendants
Independent Variables

B (S.E.)

Odds

Model 6

Women
B (S.E.)

Odds

Men
B (S.E.)

Odds

Group
DPP

Sex (male)

-0.049

0.953 -0.065

0.937 -0.003

(.093)

(.180)

(.110)

0.352

1.422 --

--

--

0.974 -0.009

0.991 -0.036

0.997

--

(.112)**

Age (years)

-0.026
(.006)***

Prior misdemeanor

0.068

arrests (number)

(.012)***

(.009)

1.070 0.095
(.017)***

0.965

(.007)***

1.100 0.055

1.056

(.014)***
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Prior felony arrests

.063

(number)

(.028)*

1.065 0.251

1.285 0.067

(.095)**

1.069

(.031)**

Offense
Burglary

PSC Cannabis

Theft

-0.118

0.888 0.220

1.246 -0.153

(.150)

(.511)

(.174)

-0.099

0.906 -0.141

0.869 -0.065

(.136)

(.259)

(.169)

-0.350

0.705 -0.472

0.624 -0.276

(.246)

(.181)

0.582 -0.811

0.444 -0.322

(.141)*
Forgery

-0.541
(.213)*

ID theft/unlawful use
of CC/Fictitious ID

(.340)*
0.852 0.091

1.095 -0.300

(.211)

(.315)

(.285)

Chi-square

0.937

0.759

0.725

(.279)

-0.160

-2 log likelihood

0.858

0.741

-7105.247

-1747.077

-4735.604

152.310***

74.644***

74.532***

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
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